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FROM NUREMBERG To THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE. Edited by Philippe Sands.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 192. Cloth,
$60; paper, $21.99.
INTRODUCTION
From Nuremberg to The Hague scours the institutions of
international criminal justice in order to examine their legitimacy and
effectiveness. This collection of essays is edited by Philippe Sands, an
eminent authority on public international law and professor at
University College London.' The five essays derive from an equal
number of public lectures held in London between April and June
2002. The essays - concise and in places informal - carefully avoid
legalese and arcania. Taken together, they cover an impressive
spectrum of issues. Read individually, however, each essay is ordered
around one or two well-tailored themes, thereby ensuring analytic
rigor. Consequently, the overall collection is accessible without being
breezy. It provides an insightful contribution to a burgeoning field and
busy debate.
Sands has assembled an illustrious group of contributors. Two of
the invited essays are authored by scholarly giants of international law.
James Crawford (Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, and Member of the United Nations (UN) International
Law Commission from 1992 to 2001) sets out the negotiation process
* Associate Professor of Law and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow, Washington & Lee
University. B.A. 1989, M.A. 1992, McGill: J.D. 1994, University of Toronto; LL.M. 1998,
J.S.D. 2002, Columbia. - Ed. I appreciate the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, and the research assistance of Erica Richards.
1. Sands directs the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) Centre for
International Courts and Tribunals at University College London. PICT engages in a
comparative and thematic analysis of the work of courts that adjudicate international crimes
in places as diverse as Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Iraq, and
Cambodia. Additional information on PICT's projects is available online at http://www.pict-
pcti.org. Sands also is a practicing barrister specializing in public international law litigation
with the Matrix Chambers in London. In this capacity, he has been involved in leading cases,
including litigation involving the former President of Chile, General Pinochet, and also
important international environmental law disputes.
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of the International Criminal Court, the permanent institution that
entered into force in 2002 to adjudicate alleged perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Andrew Clapham
(from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva)
thoughtfully examines how international criminal law has responded
to the complexity of the conduct it proscribes and the reality of
widespread public complicity in that conduct. In addition to editing
the volume, Sands also contributes an essay. He carefully explores the
interplay among national and international courts in punishing
perpetrators of international crimes. The opening essay in the volume
is by a historian, Richard Overy, who traces extant international
criminal law back to its genesis at the Nuremberg trials. Cherie Booth,
a well-known human rights litigator, authors the final essay in the
volume. She discusses how international criminal justice could
improve its response to gender violence. The involvement in the
project of Booth- and certainly also Crawford and Sands -
diversifies the volume's content insofar as these authors have
considerable litigation experience and, therefore, represent the voices
of those who argue and operationalize international law in a variety
of courts.
In terms of readership, this edited volume obviously will interest
theoreticians and practitioners in international, comparative, and
criminal law. It will also intrigue scholars of jurisprudence. From
Nuremberg to The Hague, however, also resonates outside of the legal
academy. This is in part due to the contributors' ability to present the
law in a lively and engaging manner. The volume generates even more
dynamism owing to its focus, rather uncommon within the literature,
on an interdisciplinary and victim-centered analysis. One of the
premises of this book is that, whereas "[flawyers are particularly
interested in the minutiae of technical questions[,] . . . what matters to
most people is a bigger question: is the emerging system of
international criminal justice fulfilling its objectives?" (p. 106). This
premise augments the currency of From Nuremberg to The Hague
among those who apply sociological, anthropological, psychological,
and social science methodologies to come to grips with mass atrocity
and the role of justice in transcending systemic violence.
I intend in this Review to examine the contributions and
limitations of From Nuremberg to The Hague and, in so doing, engage
in a sustained process of critique and reflection regarding the
internationalization of criminal process and its application to
individual perpetrators of collective violence. To varying degrees, each
contributor to this volume . supports this - process and its
1296 [Vol, 103:1295
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operationalization through international courts and tribunals, many of
which have been created over the past decade.2
In this regard, the contributors write within the dominant
metanarrative of international criminal law.3 This paradigm, which has
gained currency since the Nuremberg trials (pp. 22, 28), casts mass
violence as something blatantly transgressive of universal norms.
Transgressions of this magnitude constitute extraordinary acts of
criminality that necessitate thorough investigation, effective
prosecution, and retributive punishment. What is more, this heuristic
posits the need to stigmatize this behavior through special categories
of criminality that recognize the particularly opprobrious nature of the
crimes at hand. This, in turn, gives rise to proscriptions concerning
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and - inchoately - to
large-scale acts of terrorism. This heuristic takes seriously Hannah
Arendt's notion that the criminality of mass atrocity is of concern not
just to individual victims or roiled societies but also to humanity as a
whole and, consequently, that international institutions largely staffed
by individuals personally disconnected from the confict constitute
appropriate conduits to prosecute and punish offenders and, thereby,
effect justice.4 As Sands notes, there has been a proliferation of such
institutions in recent years, reflecting the reality that "the
international community has determined that the gravest crimes are
properly the subject of criminal justice systems" (p. 71). These
institutions appropriate the legitimacy of punishment as practiced by
states and reapply it in a supra-statal context to punish the "enem[ies]
of all humankind." 5
Assuredly, it is comfortable - and comforting - for the
contributors to From Nuremberg to The Hague to write within this
metanarrative. This comfort, though, also cabins the full creative
output of the volume. What I wish to accomplish in this Review Essay
is to build upon the insights and wisdom of the contributors to suggest
ways - some of which at first blush may seem eccentric or
unorthodox - through which international criminal justice might
become more effective in making the world a safer place.
2. Cherie Booth may be the most enthusiastic of the contributors regarding
international criminal law institutions and the power of individualized legal process to
transform conflict situations. Pp. 178-80.
3. JEAN-FRAN(ois LyoTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
4. HANNAH ARENDT, EIcHMANN IN JERusALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITy OF
EvIL 269 (1963) (arguing that insofar as the Holocaust was a crime against humanity, it
needed an international tribunal to do justice to it); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION 241 (1958) (calling these incidents of criminality "radical evil").




I. NUREMBERG AND HAGIOGRAPHY
As its title foreshadows, From Nuremberg to The Hague
specifically examines the evolution of international criminal justice
from the Second World War to the contemporary wave of legal
institution-building that animates international relations. The preface
equates the output of this current wave to an "emergence of a new
system of 'international criminal law"' (p. x). Sands astutely ascribes
the termination of the Second World War as coincident with the
beginnings of the mainstreaming of international criminal law,
although it is unclear whether this has reached the level of creating a
new legal "system." Instead, perhaps, international criminal law may
be thought of as a patchwork of loosely connected national, regional,
international, and hybrid judicial proceedings. That said, the Preface's
reference to a new system of international criminal law certainly is
given momentum by the creation in 2002 of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) which, assuredly, may provide precisely the sort of
permanent enforcement system Sands envisions.6
Prior to the Second World War, international criminal law
evidenced only rare - and fleeting - life signs. These included
suggestions of international or transnational criminal process in the
wake of the Turkish campaigns against the Armenians in 1915 and the
tactics of the German Kaiser in his effort to secure a German victory
over the Allies in the First World War.7 These suggestions never
gathered much momentum. Consequently, it is fair to say that prior to
World War II "individuals had no standing at all in international law
and, apart from insignificant exceptions, humanitarian law had never
been enforced." 8
To be sure, Nuremberg was somewhat of a watershed. Although
formally conducted within an institution called the International
Military Tribunal, the Nuremberg proceedings essentially were
criminal proceedings, not courts-martial. 9 These proceedings were
catalytic in "building the foundation for contemporary international
law on war crimes" (p. 28). Nuremberg also played a pivotal role in
discrediting the ex post facto defense: namely, that it is improper to
prosecute someone for an act that was legal at the time and place
where the crime was committed (p. 21).
6. Crawford also inquires whether these new institutions, in particular the ICC, create
an international justice "system." Pp. 145,150.
7. Stephan Landsman, Those Who Remember the Past May Not Be Condemned to
Repeat It, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 1564,1566-67 (2002).
8. Richard J. Goldstone, International Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the First
Decade of the 21st Century, 11 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 3, 3 (2004).
9. Landsman, supra note 7. at 1568.
1298 [Vol. 103:1295
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That said, it is important not to engage in a hagiographic treatment
of the Nuremberg proceedings. Richard Overy's essay, in which he
draws from his academic training as a historian, is to be credited for its
cautiousness. Overy does not venerate the trials, but instead examines
them with great curiosity and great care. He goes out of his way to
identify the mindset of the architects of the Nuremberg trials at the
time of the establishment of the Tribunal and at the time of the
prosecution of various cases. This is refreshing as it counters the
seductive tendency to sprinkle the past with some revisionism to make
the past conform to contemporary understandings of how it ought
to look.
Although the Nuremberg proceedings were animated by rhetoric
that evinced legalist zeal, in the end only twenty-two defendants were
indicted (p. 12). Many suspects avoided prosecution. The involvement
of non-German nationals in the atrocities was deliberately overlooked.
Moreover, the initial focus of the proceedings was not on the atrocities
perpetrated against European Jewry, but on the crime of waging an
aggressive war. In fact, Nuremberg began not as an affirmation of the
law of atrocity but rather as a condemnation of Nazi warmongering
and militarism."0 Subsequent apprehensions by the Soviet Union,
however, regarding the criminalization of waging an aggressive war -
let us not forget the Soviet invasions of Poland and Finland -
prompted a political settlement that gave birth to a new offense,
crimes against humanity, into which the deliberate persecution and
murder of Jews and gypsies could be folded (p. 21). In the end, the
indictment formally issued by the Tribunal on October 19, 1945
included four charges: a common conspiracy to wage aggressive war,
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Overy
notes that "[a]t least one of the four prosecuting states, the Soviet
Union, was guilty on three of the four counts" (p. 23). United States
prosecutors increasingly turned to atrocity evidence to sustain the
momentum of the trials while reassuring the Soviet Union. History has
recorded Nuremberg to be much more about the law of atrocity than
it actually was.
Overy also reminds us that justice at Nuremberg was highly
selective and abundantly politicized. He notes that
[e]ven while the horrors of the Nazi camp system were being revealed in
court, the Soviet authorities were setting up concentration camps in the
Soviet zone of occupation, like the isolation camp at Muhlberg on the
Elbe, where, out of 122,000 prisoners who were sent without trial to the
camp, over 43,000 were killed or died (pp. 25-26).
10. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY
IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 93 (2001) (noting also that the main evidentiary focus
was Nazi aggression and not the plight of victims of atrocities).
1299May 2005]
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The political need to prevent exposing the Soviet Union as an
international pariah sparked a legal process that limited guilt to the
German nation and, within this nation, placed responsibility upon the
shoulders of a handful of notorious individuals.
Moreover, it is telling that the title of this volume refers only to
Nuremberg and not to its companion institution, the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (colloquially referred to as the
Tokyo Tribunal)."1 Whereas some legalism did trickle into Nuremberg,
the Tokyo Tribunal was "fraught with procedural irregularities and
marred by abuses of judicial discretion."' 2 The proceedings were
abundantly politicized in a much more blatant manner than at
Nuremberg. By 1953 most of the Tokyo Tribunal's convicts had been
quietly released. What is more, by 1954 "two of the major war
criminals [it] convicted .. . became the prime minister and the minister
of foreign affairs of Japan."''3
In the ensuring decades, international criminal law mostly endured
as the preserve of a small group of academics and international
lawyers as the Cold War stymied efforts to move international
criminal law into the agora of international politics. Principally, the
Cold War triggered a sclerosis at the Security Council that hampered
efforts at international criminal law-making."4 The thawing of the Cold
War, however, led to a renaissance characterized by the "startling
growth of efforts to establish a worldwide criminal process capable of
punishing heinous crimes ranging from genocide to grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions."'" More irnportant, even, is the channeling
of this growth into a proliferation of brick-and-mortar institutions that
exercise jurisdiction over individuals. These include purely
international courts - such as the ICC 6- and ad hoc tribunals for
11. The essays only make scattered reference to the Tokyo Tribunals. Clapham raises
the fact that the Tokyo Tribunal, in some contrast to the Nuremberg Tribunal, did not deal
with issues of criminal organizations or the responsibility of Japanese industrialists. P. 41.
12. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK:
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY 103 (2004).
13. Id. at 106.
14. Crawford notes that, at the end of the Cold War, "[t]here had been no experience of
the international administration of criminal justice since the 1940s." P. 124.
15. Landsman, supra note 7, at 1565.
16. For Overy, "[t]he International Criminal Court... is a direct descendant of the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal." Pp. 28-29. Booth remarks that "[t]he ICC is part of a
continuum, a process that was catalysed in Nuremberg." P. 191. The ICC, which entered into
force on July 1, 2002, was created by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998),
available at http:l/www.un.org/ lawlicc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It is
a permanent institution mandated to investigate and prosecute the most serious crimes of
international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Id. arts. 1,
4-8. At the time of writing, ninety-seven nations have become parties to (and 139 nations
have signed) the Rome Statute. See Ratification Status, available at http://untreaty.un.orgl
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Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR)'7 and
the former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, ICTY).'" Brick-and-mortar institutions also include what
Sands calls "internationalised national courts,"' (p. 73) such as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone"9 and hybrid (UN/domestic) panels or
chambers in Kosovo,20 East Timor,2" and Cambodia. 22
ENGLISHIbible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatylO.asp (last visited June 11,
2004).
17. The ICTR was established as an ad hoc institution by the Security Council. See
Statute of the ICTR, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., ht 15, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/955 (1994). The ICTR investigates and prosecutes persons responsible for genocide
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighboring states, between January 1, 1994 and December 31,
1994. Id. para. 1.
18. The ICTY, another ad hoc institution of the Security Council, investigates and
prosecutes persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. See Statute of the ICTY,
S.C. Res. 827. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993),
para. 2.
19. The Sierra Leone Special Court (opened on March 10, 2004) was established jointly
by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to prosecute those with greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. See Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html (last
visited June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1315 (2000), adopted at the 4186th mtg. (Aug. 14,2000).
20. Special panels within the Kosovo legal system mix international and national judges
and prosecutors. See United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Regulation
2000/64 of 15 December 2000. These special panels adjudicate a variety of crimes committed
from May 1998 to June 1999 in the course of the armed conflict between Kosovo separatists
and the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but they do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over such crimes. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE MISSION IN Kosovo, Kosovo's WAR CRIMES TRIALS: AREvIEW 9 (Sept.2002).
21. Courts have been organized in East Timor with the assistance of the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET Regulation 2000/11
(2000), as amended by UNTAET Regulation 2001/25 (2001). One District Court, located in
Dili, has two Special Panels for Serious Crimes with exclusive jurisdiction over "serious
criminal offenses," namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual
offenses, and torture committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999, when pro-
Indonesian militias rampaged throughout East Timor after the region voted for
independence from Indonesia. Id. art. 9; UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, On the
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences (2000), s.
1.3; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 157, 195 (2004).
22. G.A. Res. 57/223, AIRES/57/228 B (2003), Khmer Rouge Trials, Annex Draft
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia. From 1975
to 1979, the Khmer Rouge massacred approximately 1.7 million Cambodians. The
Cambodia-UN agreement contemplates the formation of extraordinary legal chambers in
the Cambodian judicial system to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders and others most
responsible for serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law
and custom (including genocide), and international conventions recognized by Cambodia
committed during the period April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979. It remains unclear if and
when these extraordinary chambers actually will begin to hear cases.
1301May 2005]
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Although each of these institutions formally is independent from
the others, James Crawford (pp. 109-156) demonstrates how they draw
strength from each other and weave together to form the tapestry of
international criminal law. Whether this tapestry rises to the level of a
formalized system, however, is a thorny question. The question is all
the more complex because of the need to separate systematization on
an institutional level from systematization on a doctrinal level.
Institutionally speaking, international criminal tribunals operate with
some degree of independence, although they remain firmly dependent
on national political systems to capture suspects, provide witnesses,
and incarcerate convicts. This limited institutional independence is
tempered by a deeply embedded theoretical dependence. As I shall
explore further in Part III, international criminal justice has not yet
developed a free-standing theoretical framework. Although
international criminal law has made great strides in conceptualizing
the behavior it criminalizes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes), it has struggled to develop independent approaches to
determine the guilt of defendants, punish convicts, and narrate
historical tragedies. In all three of these important areas, international
criminal law depends on the often contested modalities of national
criminal law. These embedded dependencies, along with some
circumspection regarding the role of law in expiating hatred generally,
suggest that the need for vigilance in venerating the Nuremberg
Tribunal also applies to each of the institutions it has spawned. For the
international lawyer, modesty about what the law can accomplish is an
important virtue. In this vein, Sands is wise to remind us that
"[c]riminal law in general - and international law in particular - will
never be a panacea for the ills of the world" (p. 71).
II. INDIVIDUAL GUILT, ORGANIC CRIME, AND PURIFICATION
THROUGH LAW
The international criminal tribunals strongly have emphasized that
the extraordinary nature of atrocity crimes justifies the need for these
crimes to be adjudicated by international institutions. For example, in
an interlocutory ruling in the Tadi6 case, the ICTY warned of the
"perennial danger" that international crimes might be characterized as
ordinary crimes and cited this danger as justifying the primacy of the
ICTY over national courts.' Despite the extraordinary nature of the
criminality of mass atrocity, however, the approach of the
international criminal tribunals to punishment and the process of
determining guilt or innocence remains rather ordinary, and perhaps
23. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 58 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995).
1302 [Vol. 103:1295
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even staid. Under the extant heuristic of international criminal law,
accountability arises from third-party adjudication in a trial settinge
followed by incarceration. This means that the methodology of
international criminal law largely replicates methods of prosecution
and punishment dominant within those states that dominate the
international political order.25 To be sure, international criminal law
has developed its own institutions and rules.26 These, as Crawford
details, are the product of considerable hard work and diplomatic
maneuvering (pp. 135-37). I posit, however, that although these
institutions and their rules may be formally distinct from national
systems, they are not substantively distinct.27 Nor are they distinct
24. The ICTY and ICTR adhere to an adversarial Anglo-American model of
adjudication. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 6 (2003). The ICC, reflecting the fact it developed
through an internationally negotiated treaty, is more of a balance between the adversarial
approach and the inquisitorial approach preferred by the civil law. See id. at 10-11, 160. That
said, both approaches prioritize retributive, punitive, and individualized justice applied
through the incapacitation of the offender. Although international criminal justice
institutions may have harmonized adversarial and inquisitorial methodologies, this
harmonization is a political settlement among powerful international actors. It is not a
genuinely inclusive process that accommodates the disempowered victims of mass violence
- largely from non-Western audiences and often estranged from any state or government
- who consistently lack any clout in international relations.
25. See, e.g.. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2003) (arguing
that international criminal law results from the "transposition on to the international level of
rules and legal constructs proper to national criminal law or to national trial proceedings");
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2003)
(asserting that the goals of international criminal law are an extension of the goals of
national criminal law).
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, para. 22 (ICTR
Trial Chamber. July 15, 2004) ("[T]he Chamber is not bound by national rules of evidence,
but by its own Rules. Where the Rules are silent, the Chamber is to apply rules of evidence
which best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and which are consonant with
the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law."). For a discussion of the law of
evidence in the international criminal tribunals, see 2 JUDGE RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE
WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2002). I
27. Crawford discusses the choice the architects of the ICC had to make regarding how
to frame the system of international criminal justice. According to Crawford:
[I]t was possible to envisage two broad solutions. One was essentially a procedural solution.
The ICC would in effect borrow its legitimacy from a national system or systems of
international criminal justice, acting as surrogate for these, exercising their jurisdiction and
applying their substantive law to the extent that the limited rules of international criminal
law did not cover some question. The second solution was to establish, from the beginning.
an essentially autonomous international criminal justice system. with its own institutions and
rules, essentially distinct from national systems and dependent on them only for co-
operation and enforcement.
Pp. 135-36.
For Crawford, the ICC represents "the move from the first to the second model." P. 137;
see also p. 154. I agree with Crawford about the importance of making this move. I part
company with him, however, regarding the scope of movement that has thus far taken place.
Although some movement may be afoot, in my mind international criminal justice stilU has a
very long way to go before it can claim autonomous and distinct status. At present, the ICC,
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from the theory that u,nderpins dominant national criminal law
systems, thereby lending credence to Cherif Bassiouni's construction
of international criminal law as essentially reactive to tragedy, instead
of proactive and doctrinally self-supporting.2 8
There is, of course, lively debate regarding the suitability of
dominant methods of punishment in the ordinary domestic context.
The proponents of these new international institutions avoid this
debate, however, and simply apply these same methods to the context
of mass atrocity. In this sense, scholars of international criminal law
expend little effort in connecting with scholars critical of criminal law.
Assuredly, there are very few international legal scholars sufficiently
zealous to believe that criminal trials should be the only response to
mass atrocity. That said, there are many scholars who ascribe
considerable transformative potential to these trials. 29 This potential
echoes in other intellectual constituencies. 0 Moreover, the community
of international human rights,activists supports the expansion of the
international criminal justice paradigm: So, too, do many political
actors, including states, international organizations (for example, the
UN), and nongovernmental entities.
From Nuremberg to The Hague largely shares this enthusiasm for
law. Its criticisms of the extant project of international criminal justice,
although insightful, are not structural. While the volume is enriched by
its invocation of historical and feminist perspectives, it - with one
exception - does not incorporate much in the way of critical
criminology. This exception is Andrew Clapham, whose contribution
to From Nuremberg to The Hague is the most piercing.
Clapham's thesis is that massive crimes involve levels of
complexity (pp. 31-50) and complicity (pp. 50-62) that are alien to
domestic criminal law. For Clapham, "simple rules attributing conduct
to single actors fail to capture the complexity of the phenomena. . ."
(pp. 50-51; emphasis omitted). Clapham's response is modest insofar
as it operates within the paradigm of individual criminal responsibility.
Essentially, he aspires for individual criminal responsibility to be more
together with all of the institutions punishing extraordinary criminality, does not yet bring an
autonomous doctrinal framework to punishing perpetrators of mass violence.
28. BASSIOUNI, supra note 25, at xxxii, xxxvi, 583, 588.
29. See, e.g.. Payam Akhavan, Review Essay, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 712 (2003) (noting
"the euphoria surrounding the ICC's establishment"); Nehal Bhuta, Review Essay, 27 MELB.
U. L.R. 255, 256 (2003) (book review) ("[I]nternational lawyers' enthusiasm for the concept
of international criminal law has only increased .... '[I]nternational justice' at times appears
in danger of becoming a panacea for the problems of contemporary international order,
allegedly fulfilling a cornucopia of objectives . . . :").
30. John M. Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?.: Legalism and the
International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 55, 62 (2003) (noting that "faith in
the ICC ... is held quite strongly in Western intellectual circles").
1304 [Vol. 103:1295
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aggressively asserted against a greater number of individuals. 3"
This is, so to speak, a "widening of the net" (p. 62). One way to
widen the net is to call on theories of individual culpability that
take into account the role of collective action.'Recent jurisprudence
from the ICTR and ICTY has invoked collective liability theories
along these lines to ground convictions for atrocities in Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia.32 These theories specifically include joint
criminal enterprise, conspiracy, complicity, command responsibility,
and incitement.
The Niyitegeka judgment is illustrative.33 Eliezer Niyitegeka, a
journalist and newscaster on Radio Rwanda, was appointed Minister
of Information in the genocidal government that assumed power in
April 1994.34 The ICTR convicted him on a variety of counts, including
conspiracy to commit genocide. The ICTR ruled that the existence of
a conspiracy and the specific intent to commit genocide among the
conspirators could be established circumstantially. In this case, the
ICTR considered a variety of testinioriial and documentary evidence
as germane to proof of the specific intent to commit genocide. 35 In
terms of proving the existence of a conspiracy, the ICTR held that the
"organized manner in which the attacks were carried out...
presupposes the existence of a plan."36
31. Pp. 58, 67. "We can hope that this wide net of accountability, covering not only
people in positions of authority but also those who simply aid and abet others, should serve
to prevent crimes as people alter their conduct to avoid liability." P. 67.
32. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Apr. 19, 2004)
(convicting defendant of aiding and abetting genocide and substituting that for a conviction
at trial as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide); Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, Dec. 3, 2003) (convicting three
defendants for Conspiracy to Commit Genocide and Direct and Public Incitement of
Genocide through the media); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T (ICTR Trial
Chamber, May 15, 2003) (convicting defendant of Complicity in Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity and sentencing him to twenty-five years' imprisonment); Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A' (ICTR Appeals Chamber, Nov. 16, 2001) (convicting
director of a tea factory of genocide based on command responsibility and sentencing him to
life imprisonment); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 220 (ICTY Appeals
Chamber, July 15, 1999) (holding that intent in joint criminal enterprise liability can be
shown directly or "as a matter of inference from the nature of the accused's authority within
the ... organizational hierarchy").
33. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15,
2003) (convicting defendant on a number of charges, including conspiracy to commit
genocide, and sentencing him to life imprisonment), affd, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A (ITCR
Appeals Chamber, July 19,2004).
34. Id. para. 2.
35. This includes evidence regarding Niyitegeka's participation in and attendance at
meetings, planning of attacks, distribution of weapons to attackers, expression of support of
the Rwandan Prime Minister, actions or inactions in failing to protect the victimized Tutsi
population, and his general leadership role. Id. para. 427.




In another case, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, a different ICTR Trial
Chamber explicitly relied on the Niyitegeka decision in support of the
propriety of inferring an agreement to commit conspiracy to commit
genocide from circumstantial evidence.37 In that decision, it was
additionally held that such an agreement "can be inferred from
coordinated actions by individuals who have a common purpose and
are acting within a unified framework."3 8 Assuredly, this alone is not
an expansive reading of conspiracy as a basis for liability.39 The ICTR,
however, went on to note that
[a] coalition, even an informal coalition, can constitute such a framework
so long as those acting within the coalition are aware of its existence,
their participation in it, and its role in furtherance of their common
purpose .... [C]onspiracy to comniit genocide can be comprised of
individuals acting in an institutional capacity... independently of their
personal links with each other.40
In sum, conspiracy as a basis for culpability has become
less controversial than it initially was when boldly introduced
at Nuremberg.4 '
Interestingly, though, the ICTY has begun to express some
concern with the expansive use of collective liability theories to
ground individual criminal responsibility as a direct participant. On
July 24, 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed sixteen of the
nineteen convictions previously entered by an ICTY Trial Chamber
against Bosnian Croat military officer Tihomir Blaski6 for ordering
crimes against Muslim civilians and for failing as a commander to
42asChmeprevent the commission of those crimes. The Appeals Chamber
expressed concern with elements of vicarious liability that apparently
had informed the Trial Chamber's interpretation of ordering and
command responsibility.43 Instead, the Appeals Chamber emphasized
37. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, para. 1046.
3& Id. para.1047.
39. Cf. United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
904 (1974).
40. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, paras. 1047-48.
41. Overy does a masterful job at setting out this controversy. Pp. 14-18, 28. Whereas
conspiracy enjoys considerable legitimacy within the Anglo-American common law, many
civil law jurisdictions remain somewhat inhospitable to criminal conviction based on
conspiracy.
42. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, July 29,
2004).
43. See also Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 455, 456 (2001) ("Generally speaking, international criminal law on [command
responsibility] seems to be somewhat more hospitable to notions of vicarious liability and
other legal constructs which, in their practical application - if not already in their
formnlation - display a measure of insensitivity to the degree of the actor's own personal
culpability.").
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the need for the prosecutor to prove subjective awareness (or, at a
minimum, recklessness) to secure a conviction.44 Moreover, in the
September 1, 2004, decision in Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, an ICTY Trial
Chamber rejected joint criminal enterprise in a case with an
extraordinarily broad nature and in which the accused was physically
and structurally remote from the crimes.45
What is more, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also recently
overturned the conviction of General Krsti6, a General-Major in the
Bosnian Serb army at the time it massacred 7000 to 8000 Bosnian
Muslim men in the UN safe-haven of Srebrenica.45 Initially, an ICTY
Trial Chamber had convicted Krstic as a primary perpetrator based on
joint criminal enterprise. In the earlier Tadic decision, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber had held that joint criminal enterprise is an
extended form of individual criminal responsibility that "embraces
actions perpetrated by a collectivity of persons in furtherance of a
common criminal design."47 In the trial decision in Krsti6, the ICTY
noted that genocidal intent could be inferred circumstantially from
44. Regarding ordering, the Appeals Chamber held that "a person who orders an act or
omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in
the execution of that order [ has the requisite mens rea for establishing liability...."
Blaskid Case No. IT-95-14-A, paras. 42,166. For the Appeals Chamber, "[t]he knowledge of
any kind of risk [that violations would occur], however low, does not suffice for the
imposition of criminal responsibility .... [U]nder the Trial Chamber's standard, any military
commander who issues an order would be criminally responsible, because there is always a
possibility that violations could occur." Id. para. 41. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber
criticized the understanding of command responsibility adopted by the Trial Chamber,
affirming instead a different understanding, according to which "a superior will be criminally
responsible through the principles of superior responsibility only if information was
available to him which would have put him on notice of offences commnitted by
subordinates." Id. para. 62 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted): see also para. 406.
45. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, Sept. 1, 2004).
The Trial Chamber also held that, although genocidal intent may be inferred
circumstantially, in cases where direct evidence is absent, the inference of intent must be the
only reasonable inference available. Id.
46. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 2 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Apr.
19. 2004).
47. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 193 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, July
15, 1999). All participants in a joint criminal enterprise are equally guilty of the crime
regardless of their individual roles in its commission. The ICTY has defined a joint criminal
enterprise as
an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement between two or more persons
that they will commit a crime. The understanding or arrangement need not be express, and
its existence may be inferred from all the circumstances. It need not have been reached at
any time before the crime is committed. The circumstances in which two or more persons are
participating together in the commission of a particular crime may themselves establish an
unspoken understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement formed between them
then and there to commit that crime.
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, para. 80 (ICTY Trial
Chamber, Mar. 15, 2002), this conclusion affd, Case No. IT-97-25-A (ICTY Appeals
Chamber, Sept. 17,2003).
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proof that Krsti6 was aware of the genocidal intent of other members
of the Bosnian Serb Army but did nothing to prevent the use of army
resources and personnel under his command to facilitate the killings.48
The ICTY Appeals Chamber held that a conviction for genocide only
can be entered where the specific intent of genocide unequivocally
has been established.49 In the case of a joint criminal enterprise, that
intent must be shared by the co-perpetrators. By holding that Krstic
did not possess the requisite genocidal intent, the ICTY set some
boundaries around the potentially broad scope of joint criminal
enterprise announced in Tadi6. This finding, however, only relieved
Krsti6 from conviction as a principal perpetrator of genocide based on
his direct involvement in a joint criminal enterprise. The ICTY
Appeals Chamber instead substituted a conviction for aiding and
abetting genocide - which it deemed to reflect a less serious level of
criminal responsibility - and sentenced Krsti6 to thirty-five years'
imprisonment, rather than his previous sentence of forty-six years.50
Consequently, and notwithstanding its circimspection, the ICTY
continues to convict based on collective-liability theories that, to some
extent, tinker with traditional understandings of individual criminal
culpability in order to suit this culpability to the special context of
mass atrocity.5" After all, the Appeals Chamber did recognize that
"there was no evidence that Krstic ordered any of these murders, or
that he directly participated in them. All the evidence can establish is
that he knew that those murders were occurring and that he permitted
the Main Staff to use personnel and resources under his command to
facilitate them."52
48. Krsti, Case No. IT-98-33-A, paras. 42, 83.
49. Id. para. 134.
50. Id. paras. 237, 275. The ICTR also has convicted for genocide based on secondary
involvement as an aider and abettor. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi. Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I
(ICTR Trial Chamber, July 14,2004).
51. For example, in the Vasiljevic case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber convicted a
defendant of persecution on a theory of aiding and abetting even though no principal
perpetrator was on trial and even though two alleged co-perpetrators remained unidentified.
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, para. 102 (ICTY Appeals
Chamber, Feb. 25, 2004). Blagki& was not convicted of aiding and abetting war crimes or
crimes against humanity, but this was not because of substantive interpretation of the scope
of aiding and abetting. Instead, the Blaskic Appeals Chamber did not consider the issue
because the claim was insufficiently litigated on appeal and not fairly encompassed in the
indictment. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A, para. 52 (ICTY Appeals Chamber,
July 29, 2004); see also Damaska, supra note 43, at 461 (discussing the ICTY position on
complicity as one in which "no causal link needs to be proven between a superior's act of
assistance and the crime conmiitted by subordinates" (citation omitted)).
52. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, para. 144. Although the Appeals Chamber came to
these conclusions specifically in regard to Krsti6's commission of crimes against humanity
and war crimes, they are indicative of the genocide charges as well.
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Assuredly, this more generous use of conspiracy and aiding and
abetting is understandable given the need to adapt the essentially
stringent modalities of proof under the ordinary criminal law to the
different context of mass atrocity, where gangs maul groups of victims
and where survivors hide in ceilings, latrines, and under dead bodies,
often for weeks at a time. In this inferno, exactly documenting which
militant murdered which specific victim .at what time of the day
through corroborated eye-witness testimony - the ideal-type of the
modern law of evidence - simply is unrealistic.53 The use of forensic
evidence to personalize death amid the anonymity of mass graves
presents immense challenges. What is more, most postconflict
societies lack the resources and technology to safeguard whatever
evidence is preserved and analyzed. Viewed through the prism of
these realities, recourse to generous - and at times somewhat
vicarious - liability theories becomes eminently understandable
insofar as these theories permit the tribunals to ascribe individual guilt
in cases where violence has several, and often murky, organic sources.
I certainly share Clapham's hope that this broader ascription of
individual responsibility will serve a deterrent effect (p. 67). As I see
it, however, the adaptation of the paradigm of individual guilt to the
cauldron of collective violence that has gained currency with the
international criminal tribunals is much more form than substance.
Although this adaptation may, for Clapham, amount to a "new way[]
of thinking about the prosecution of violations of international
crimes" (p. 66), it is really just a "new way" in a very modest sense.
Truly recognizing the riddle of collective action requires more than
just an extension of the dominant discourse of ordinary criminal law,
which embraces liberalism's understanding of the individual as the
central unit of action and thereby deserving of blame when things go
terribly wrong.54 This understanding echoes one of the most famous
legacies of Nuremberg, namely the Tribunal's pronouncement that
"[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."55 This
predicate carries through to modern institutions of international
53. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I para. 27.; BASSIOUNI, sucpra note 25, at 633-
34.
54. BASSIOUNI, sutpra note 25, at 685.
55. Pp. 32-33. Despite this bold pronouncement, the Nuremberg Tribunal did engage in
some ascription of collective liability. For example, Clapham points out that it did declare
certain organizations, including the Nazi Party and the Gestapo, to be criminal
organizations. P. 34. Moreover, the trials were held collectively.
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criminal justice, including the ICC, which only can try individuals.56
The complication, however, is that criminal law systems focused on
individual responsibility may be ill-suited to promote accountability
for collective wrongdoing. There is a schizophrenia, one which
emerges tellingly in the Blaskic proceedings: these systems incorporate
vicarious legal elements in order to secure convictions, but
then express concern that criminalization ought not be based on
vicarious liability.
One response might be for the law of atrocity to consider
redressing collective violence through collective modalities of
accountability. That said, international criminal law's reification of
individual responsibility reflects a fear of collective responsibility,
collective blame, and, especially, collective guilt. This fear ought to be
reappraised dispassionately, by recognizing the specific nature of mass
atrocity and differentiating it from ordinary criminal liability. Given
the unique nature of the extraordinary criminality of mass atrocity,
shouldn't this criminality be addressed through a unique and
independent doctrinal and theoretical framework? I have elsewhere
called for the law of atrocity to build its own penology, criminology,
and victimology.57 The absence of an independent theoretical
framework obliges international criminal law to invoke the rationales
of domestic criminal law. This invocation may be convenient, but it
comes with a price: namely, such a system glosses over the fact that the
perpetrator of mass atrocity is qualitatively different than the
perpetrator of ordinary crime. Whereas ordinary criminals tend to
deviate from mainstream society when they commit crimes,58 those
individuals who perpetrate the extraordinary crimes that collectively
lead to mass atrocity are not so deviant in the times and places in
56. P. 48. Under the ICC, "[i]t will not be possible to bring cases against states, nor will
there be cases against political organizations or companies." P. 48.
57. Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REJv. 539 (forthcoming 2005).
58. There are certain ordinary crimes that may not be so starkly deviant and,
consequently, not so clearly distinguishable from extraordinary international crimes. For
example, organized crime, hate crime, and gang activity may occur in social conditions that
loosely parallel those found in conflict societies. Perpetrators of these offenses may not
perceive themselves as deviant and may in fact not deviate measurably from codes of
conduct prevalent within their self-identified social community. They may well be
conforming to these codes. That said, there are stark differences between these social
communities and those societies entirely afflicted by the breakdown and remobilization that
are conditions precedent to systemic violence. In these societies, national leaders, courts,
laws, and bureaucracies may legalize the violence and, instead of punishing individual
perpetrators, may actually encourage their behavior. This means that murder, torture, and
sexual assault deviate less from mainstream norms in these societies than they would from
norms in societies with violent or criminal sub-cultures. However, in terms of those areas of
domestic activity where individual deviance may be obfuscated by group order, I certainly
welcome criminological, preventative, and penological doctrine that recognizes the influence
of the group as a social agent and the structural nature of criminogenic conditions.
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question. There is a deep contradiction in their behavior: although
they transgress a juis cogens norm, this transgression often results from
adhesion to a social norm that is much closer to home.59 This deep
complicity cascade does not diminish the brutality or exculpate the
aggressor, but it implicates, and in many ways problematizes, a variety
of important issues. These include bystander innocence, reparations
for victims, reconciliation, groupthink, reintegration of offenders, and
the dual role of the international community as enabler of violence
and as arbiter of right or wrong.
Violence would not reach epidemic proportions without support
from the masses. Whereas Clapham might respond to this through
more expansive individual criminal liability, Cherie Booth espouses an
even more traditionalist approach tightly connected to Nuremberg.
Booth would narrow criminal liability only to those deemed most
responsible so as to deliberately avoid the perception of "collective
responsibility" (p. 184). The assumption, however, that a handful of
people are to be blamed for the mass murder of hundreds of
thousands may not be a realistic appraisal of life within societies
engulfed by violent cataclysm. Although 'that handful certainly
may be the most blameworthy, this does not mean that everyone else
is innocent.
Rwanda presents a particularly telling example. From April to July
1994, a government comprised of extremist members of the Hutu
ethnic group initiated a populist genocide in which 800,000 Rwandans
(approximately ten percent of the national population) were
murdered."i The victims were overwhelmingly from the Tutsi ethnic
group. In July 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military
wing of a then extraterritorially based Tutsi political party called the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda. The RPA ousted
the genocidal government, placed the RPF in power, and largely
quelled the genocide.
The speed, intensity, and rapidity of the Rwandan genocide was
nearly triple that of the Nazi Holocaust.6 ' It is estimated that upwards
of one million persons (a staggeringly high number among a national
population of seven to eight million) were involved as perpetrators in
the genocide: some physically doing the killing, others as accomplices,
59. Jus cogens are the array of peremptory norms applicable to all states from which no
derogation is possible.
60. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 261, 264-65
(rev. ed. 1997).
61. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 4 (1998).
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facilitators, and aiders and abettors.6 2 In Rwanda, killing became a
civic duty enthusiastically put into place by broad swaths of the
population. The violence was not anarchic; it arose from the conscious
implementation of a shared social norm, according to which "[t]he
government, and an astounding number of its subjects, imagined that
by exterminating the Tutsi people they could make the world a better
place."63 To these killers and their,accomplices must be added the
millions of other Rwandans who silently acquiesced to the killings.
After all, there was nothing secret about these killings; they were
committed publicly, with butchered bodies piled up in every
neighborhood throughout the country. No one could have been
oblivious to them. That said, many people averted their gaze: some
out of fear of recrimination, others because they did not object, and
many more because they supported the extirpation.
In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, there has been considerable
reliance on national and international trials to pursue a myriad of
goals, including accountability, peace, reconciliation, and truth-telling.
The international proceedings held at the ICTR operationalize the
premise of selective, individualized, retributive criminal justice that
underpins international criminal law. The ICTR was established by
the UN Security Council on November 8, 1994 to investigate and
prosecute political, military, and civic leaders for their involvement in
the genocide.64 All told, as of mid-2004 the ICTR has arrested sixty-six
individuals on charges of individual criminal responsibility (for
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) for the Rwandan
atrocity' and has issued twenty convictions.66 There have been three
acquittals (two of which remain subject to appeal). Given the ICTR's
annual budget of $180 million,67 this breaks down to an average cost of
nearly $80 million for each individual defendant for whom a trial
verdict has been issued. Rwandan authorities and national prosecutors
62. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1221.1250 (2000).
63. GOUREVITCH, supra note 61, at 6.
64. See Statute of the ICTR, suprq note 17, arts. 2-4. Ironically, Rwanda was the only
member of the Security Council not to support the creation of the ICTR. Rwanda objected
to the limited temporal jurisdiction of the ICIR and the fact that it cannot issue a death
sentence. On February 22, 1995, the Security Council resolved that the ICTR would be
based in Arusha, a city in northern Tanzania. This, too, was of concern to the Rvwandan
government, which understandably would have preferred that the tribunal be sited in
Rwanda.
65. ICTR Detainees - Status on 20 September 2004, at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
factsheets/detainee.htm (Sept. 20, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Gerald Gahima, Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Comments to the Fifth Biennial
Conference of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (June 7-10, 2003)
(transcript on file with the author).
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have interceded in an attempt to broaden the circle of accountability,
arresting another 130,000 individuals. This is a significant number of
detainees. Poor infrastructure, lack of funding from donor states, turf
battles with the ICTR, and fairly routine criticism from the
international community regarding the integration of international
due process norms all have hampered the effectiveness (not to
mention the occurrences) of domestic trials for these detainees. Thus
far, estimates suggest that from 6500 to 8000 such trials have been
held.68 The Rwandan government now is turning to traditional dispute
resolution (called gacaca) to determine wrongdoing with a view to
reintegrating offenders. The decision to subject persons accused of
genocide to gacaca has prompted withering criticism from
international human rights activists and considerable reserve on the
part of the international community.69
The deliberate choice by international criminal justice institutions
to selectively blame a handful of individuals for mass violence also
may serve selfish purposes. Pinning responsibility on a few erases not
only the involvement of ordinary Rwandans, but also the involvement
of the international community in the violence. The ICTR's judicial
reductionism absolves the role of international agencies, transnational
economic processes, the foreign policies of influential states, and
colonial policies, each of which exacerbated ethnic conflict by creating
an environment conducive to violence in Rwanda. It also glosses over
decisions by foreign states to igrnore the violence after it had begun,70
and the international community's failure adequately to support
peacekeeping or peace enforcement. 7 '
It may be convenient to place blame for mass violence on selected
savage individuals, instead of offering a fuller - and much more
68. BBC News, Mass Genocide Verdict Delivered, Aug. 1, 2003 (on file with the author);
Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwvanda, 9
GLOBAL GOvERNANcE 219, 223 (2003): 18 Sentenced to Death in Rwanda in 2003 -
Amnesty, Hirondelle News Agency (Lausanne), May 31, 2004 (on file with the author). The
ICTR has announced that in 2005 it will begin transferring cases to national courts, including
Rwandan courts; up to forty-one cases may be considered for potential transfer. Completion
Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Apr. 26, 2004), paras. 4-7,
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHI/ completionstrat/s-2004-341.pdf. Talk of transfer
is motivated by the ICTR's financial difficulties and impending deadlines for the completion
of trials and appeals, and not by a framework of reference that suggests that holding these
trials at the national level would be more effective in attaining the goals posited for these
trials. ICTR to Refer 45 Cases to Rwanda, MONITOR (KAMPALA), Aug. 19, 2004, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200408180472.html.
69. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE, Rep.
AFR 47/10/00 (2000).
70. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002).
71. ROMfo DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 79 (2003).
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embarrassing - display of the multiple political, economic, historical,
and colonial factors that facilitate violence. The trade-off for this
convenience, though, is a narrower breadth of justice and a
compromised preventative strategy. By virtue of its leaving the acts
and omissions of international agents untouched, international
criminal law fails to allocate blame according to degrees of
responsibility. This, in turn, leads to a retributive shortfall, insofar as
only a few people receive their just deserts while many powerful states
and organizations avoid accountability.
Even more frustrating is the seeming inability of ex post legal
sanction to prod the UN - or influential states - toward taking
assertive ex ante preventative measures. A telling example is that, on
the ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, massive human
rights violations rage in Darfur, Sudan, precipitating the deaths of at
least 30,000 civilians and foretelling an imminent humanitarian
disaster.72 Although the UN has warned of this catastrophe, it has
procrastinated in taking more direct action.73 The UN largely is an
agent of the political will of influential states, so this piddling can
directly be traced back to some of those states. There is a painful
similarity between the initial response of the international community
to the Darfur crisis and the 1994 crisis in Rwanda. For example, there
has been considerable legalistic debate over whether black Africans in
72. UN and US Warn that Huge Toll in Darficr Crisis is Now Inevitable, Agence France-
Presse, June 3, 2004 (on file with the author): Emily Wax, 'A Big Sheik' Denies Crisis in
Darfur, WASH. POST, July 18, 2004, at Al (reporting that 1.2 million people have been
displaced from Darfur by militia violence that has killed another 30,000).
73. Eric Reeves, Genocide in Sudan, THESE TIMES, May 6, 2004, at 16, 22 (reporting
that "[U.N. Secretary-General] Annan has yet to make concrete proposals for either the
resources or the mandate that would guide an intervention. The U.N.'s failure to act ensures
that hundreds of thousands of Darfurians will die in the coming months."); Wax, supra note
72 (reporting that the United States has urged the Sudanese government to disarm the
militia but that militia leaders continue to roam free). On June 11, 2004, the Security Council
adopted a resolution that "urged an immediate halt to violence in Darfur" but that did not
propose any concrete action. UN Approves Peacekeeping Operation in Sudan, GLOBE &
MAIL, June 11, 2004. On July 30, 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1556, which
requested the Sudanese government to disarm and prosecute rampaging militia but only
went so far as to state that it would "consider further actions" in the event the Sudanese
government failed to do so. A draft of Resolution 1556 provided for sanctions in the event of
Sudanese noncompliance, but seven of the fifteen members of the Security Council
(including Algeria, China, and Pakistan) expressed reluctance with this wording and it was
subsequently dropped. Mikael Nabati, ASIL Insights: The U.N. Responds to the Crisis in
Darfur: Security Council Resolution 1556, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl42.htm (Aug.
2004). In the wake of Resolution 1556. the Sudahese government agreed to take steps to
disarm the militias; however, serious attacks continue and the Sudanese government has
restricted relief flights to the region. Nima Elbagir, Sudan Launches New Round of Attacks
in Darfur, Reuters, Aug. 10. 2004; Somini Sengupta, Death and Sorrow Stalk Sudanese
Across Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al.
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Darfur are being subject to genocide, but much less in the way of
intervention to prevent and protect them from attack.74
III. GROUP SANCTION
Group sanction can take various forms. Among these, collective
guilt (or blame) is the starkest. Here, criminal liability is attributed to
the perpetrator group, whether a state75 or a specific ethnic, racial,
religious, or political group. Methods of punishment traditional to
international criminal law, in particular incarceration, would flow from
this attribution. Since groups and states are not natural persons,
incarceration would have to be visited upon individuals comprising the
group or state. For the most part, collective guilt is viewed dubiously,76
although one scholar, George Fletcher, has made an interesting -
albeit limited - case for it.77
There are other, less invasive, forms of group sanction. These flow
not from collective guilt, but rather from a notion of collective liability.
This category of group sanction would invoke the kinds of remedies
that ordinary law might mandate in cases of tort or civil delict
(especially where punitive damages are called for in addition to
compensatory damages). These include the imposition of economic
sanctions and trade restrictions on the perpetrator state or
group,78 embargoes, fines, taxes, coerced international territorial
administration, and restriction on travel of group members. In this
regard, the discussion of collective liability I raise here would tend
more toward the law of state responsibility or countermeasures
than international criminal law per se. In any event, although
74. Steven R. Weisman, Powell Says Rapes and Killings in Sudan Are Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A3 (noting the U.S. statement that the Darfur violence is genocide
but also objections raised by other Security Council members). A United Nations
Commission of Inquiry concluded that the violence in Darfur amounted to crimes against
humanity but not to genocide. Frederic L. Kirgis, United Nations Commission's Report on
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Darfur, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 2005.
75. As Crawford notes, state criminal liability has "gained very little acceptance, and it
was deliberately rejected by the ILC [International Law Commission] in its Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)." P. 116.
76. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under Iiternational Law: Do Tort
Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 579,585 (1997).
77. George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 163,168, 169, 173-74 (2004) (positing that collective guilt is a "plausible . .. and
sometimes healthy response to collective wrongdoing").
78. Since the advent of the. Charter of the United Nations, states and international
organizations have on numerous occasions turned to economic sanctions as an enforcement
mechanism where a state fails to comply with international law or, more broadly, as a




history teaches us that economic sanctions can have devastating
indiscriminate effects on individuals in targeted countries (effects that
may be harsher even than penal sanctions), these forms of civil
liability certainly lack the denunciatory stigma of the criminal law.
There are also more original ways of thinking about group
sanction. I offer, as a starting point, a perspective that treats victims as
individuals and aggressors in the collective (instead of international
criminal law's current focus on victims in the collective and aggressors
as individuals). This approach might facilitate the development of
remedies that stigmatize active and passive involvement in mass
atrocity but also focus on the need -to restore victims (which is often
overlooked in criminal law systems aimed at retribution). This model
would structure group sanction around the notion of collective
responsibility, which differs from collective guilt, blame, or liability.
Remedies for collective responsibility recognize that for many victims,
justice means more than simply the imprisonment of offenders. As
such, restorative, commemorative, and reparative approaches could
help operationalize collective responsibility.
The use of gacaca in Rwanda invokes certain elements of the
collective responsibility paradigm. Tens of thousands of individuals
accused of a broad array of crimes during the genocide (ranging from
intentional homicide to looting) will face gacaca proceedings in which
they will return to the communities where they allegedly committed
their crimes to face judgment by the whole community. Although
gacaca has gotten off to a shaky start, it has the promise to fulfill
many goals, including advancing managerial concerns, promoting
atonement, meting out accountability, and overseeing restoration. 79
Among the remedies contemplated by the gacaca proceedings are
community service, which "may involve rebuilding destroyed schools,
houses or clinics, maintenance work on buildings, roads or gardens,
crop cultivation to feed the prison population, educational and
motivational activities, first aid or personal care."80 These remedies
displace the traditional focus on punishment and, in the words of one
observer, amount to "collective reparations."'"
From Nuremberg to The Hague does not actively discuss these
novel Temedies. In fact, it avoids the thicket of group sanction
altogether, thereby belying its conceptualization of international
criminal justice as synonymous with individual criminal trials. Frankly,
this is not surprising. Conversations about group sanction are
awkward because of international criminal law's discomfort with
79. For a detailed discussion of the structure and implementation of gacaca, see Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 21, at 192-95.
80. Id. at 194.
81. Id.
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collective blame, which, in turn, motivates the focus of accountability
on a relatively small number of high-profile trials. Booth, writing
within the context of the ICC and citing eminent South African jurist
Richard Goldstone, echoes this conventional wisdom:
[P]roceedings before the ICC have the potential of countering the
attribution of collective responsibility for acts committed by individuals.
Richard Goldstone put it well when commenting on the emotive
photographs of the accused in the dock at Nuremberg. He said that 'one
sees a group of crirninals. One does not see a group of representatives of
the German people - the people who produced Goethe or Heine or
Beethoven.' (p. 184)
The point of the matter is that the people who produced Goethe,
Heine and Beethoven also produced Goebbels, Himmler, and
Mengele. If Goldstone is to credit the entire German people for
producing artistic geniuses, why should they be spared responsibility
for producing mass criminals? The logic of collective exoneration is
somewhat frail.
Assuredly, there is a need to accommodate managerial concerns. It
is proper to suggest that a narrow, individualized criminal law
paradigm is suitable if truly purposive and broad mechanisms of
accountability would be too unwieldy and costly. This managerial
ethic, however, is not the rationale animating criminal trials of a
handful of perpetrators. That rationale, instead, draws from a belief
that prosecuting a small number of individuals (generally officials or
leaders, but not necessarily so) serves a broad range of normative
goals such as retribution, reconciliation, peace, and narrating history.
On this latter point, if as Milan Kundera suggested, "the struggle of
man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting,"82 it
remains unclear how well individual trials relate historical truths about
collective violence. Nuremberg Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson
famously advised that criminal proceedings could be a mechanism
to "establish incredible events by credible evidence"'83 and thereby
authenticate a historical record. In the case of Nuremberg, trials
played an important didactic role and helped create a broadly shared
narrative of Nazi aggression and atrocity. In other cases, like the
Tokyo Tribunal, there is little evidence that trials accomplished much
in the way of historical authentication, individual punishment, or
storytelling. For the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals that currently motor
the operation of international criminal law, only time will tell. What
seems odd, though, is that despite the strenuous efforts expended by
82. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETrING 3 (Michael Henry
Heim trans., 1986).
83. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRiALS 54 (1992).
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the ICTY to individualize guilt, there is scant evidence that individual
Bosnians, Croats, or Serbs blame other individuals for the crimes;
rather, it seems that they still accord much of the blame on the other
groups.5 Consequently, it does not appear that individualized
guilt dissipates the specter of collective blame. These de facto
realities, in turn, suggest that international lawyers might consider
de jure methods of accountability that accept the responsibility
of collectivities.
Thus far, I have discussed group sanction as a retrospective way to
effect some justice after atrocity has occurred. But it also is important
to think about group sanction as a deterrent or preventative
mechanism. International criminal lawyers tell us that criminal
punishment can have a deterrent effect, as potential perpetrators
might restrain themselves from committing extraordinary acts of
international criminality out of a fear of getting caught and served up
for prosecution before an international tribunal. Let me argue here
that group sanctions might serve a more effective deterrent role.
As we have learned from Rwanda, mass atrocity is not the product
of random or spontaneous behavior. Rather, it largely is planned,
deliberate, and orchestrated. Perpetrators often participate because
they want to or because it is rational for them to do so at the time.
This rationality can stem from the reality that subordinates stand to
gain when they follow the orders of their superiors. It also derives
from the sickening reality that "a large number of people ... find war
and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down."l' There
also is an emotive or affective component to mass violence. This
component can be particularly compelling: participants want to be
part of a collective movement, want that movement to succeed, seek
the status and privileges of that success, and often believe that they are
doing good by committing evil. As journalist Robert Kaplan notes,
"people find liberation in violence."' 6
Many leaders of violent movements are what political scientists
would call conflict entrepreneurs. These are individuals who stand to
gain economically, socially, and politically from violent conflict.
Conflict entrepreneurs may deliberately create, exacerbate, inflame,
or manipulate ethnic, racial, religious, national, or political cleavages
in order to consolidate their power. One thing we have learned from
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is the pervasiveness of ethnic
hate propaganda in fuelling the violence in the Balkans and Rwanda.
Through this demagoguery, conflict entrepreneurs badgered and
84. David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding:
Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT'L STUD. REV. 355,368 (2004).
85. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY 44 (2000).
86. Id. at 45.
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brainwashed ordinary citizens to see good in committing violence.
This faith, together with the dehumanization of the scapegoated
enemy, makes it much easier for ordinary people to participate in
communal butchery. Moreover, the death of the enemy often results
in individual privileges and rewards for the killer (more land, money,
and goods; promotion in rank; enhanced social status; pride as a
patriot). In other cases, for example Sierra Leone, the horrible
internecine violence had little to do with demographic categories.87
This violence engulfed civilians in repeat nonideological conflict
conducted among w arlords, rebels, and government henchmen
fighting to control lucre, natural resources, or power. At a certain
point it becomes rational for ordinary citizens to join some side for
protection and to play the game - after all, if you are on no one's
side, no one is on yours, and you'll never win. This is how individual
rationality metastasizes into the tragedy of collective irrationality.
It is not just genocide that is ordered and derivative of community
sources. So, too, are international crimes such as terrorism and
systemic human rights violations such as prisoner abuse. These crimes
and abuses do not just happen, but instead occur for reasons that
transcend the individual perpetrator's malevolence. Large-scale
terrorism, for example, is the product of much more than just the
behavior of a handful of suicide-bombers. These individuals are
financed, supported, coddled, and placated by a broader array of
people and, on occasion, states. An even broader set of actors turns a
blind eye to them. There is a continuum of responsibility at play. The
difficult questions are whether law can thwart the continuum and, if
so, how? Clearly, it is problematic to assume that law can deter those
who would kill themselves in order to kill others. But without broader
support, whether it be direct, indirect, passive, or acquiescent, these
individuals would not pose the danger that they do. It is to this
phenomenon that law should focus its attention. International criminal
law as presently constituted, however, seems unable, or unwilling, to
do so.
Moreover, as philosopher Michael Ignatieff observes, systemic
human rights abuses can be perpetrated by anyone in the name of any
side to a conflict.88 The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib,
deliberately contoured to include sexual humiliation, reveals that no
one is immune.89 In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, familiar tensions
87. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 150 (2004).
88. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL 115,118 (2004).
89. Scott Higham and Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST,
May 21, 2004, at Al (reporting investigations of allegations at Abu Ghraib of savage
beatings, prisoners being forced to retrieve food from toilets, sexual molestation, force-
-- ---------- - --- -
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emerge: the easy answer (let's punish a handful of perverted, abusive
individual perpetrators for their independent actions), on the one
hand, and more discomfiting questions (did these individual guards act
because they were ordered, encouraged, or permitted to do so by
more senior commanders?;' or because the chain of command was
muddied among military and civilian-corporate superiors?;9 or
because they grotesquely exaggerated perceived cues from high-level
policy decisions to miniimize the role of law in the name of national
security?) on the other.92 The role of law in accounting for Abu
feeding of pork and liquor to Muslim prisoners, forcing prisoners to bark like dogs, riding
prisoners like animals, forced masturbation, rape, and sodomy).
90. See Bradley Graham & Josh White, Top Pentagon Leaders Faulted in Prison Abuse,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al (reporting that an independent panel concluded that top
Pentagon civilian and military leaders, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, failed to
exercise adequate oversight and allowed conditions that led to the abuse of detainees in
Iraq); Thom Shanker & Kate Zernike, Abuse Inquiry Faults Officers on Leadership, N.Y.
TtMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (reporting that a high-level Army inquiry found that, although
there was no evidence of direct culpability above the colonel who commanded the military
intelligence unit of the Abu Ghraib prison, senior U.S. commanders created conditions that
allowed abuses to occur); Frederick Gets 8 Years in Iraq Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2004 (reporting on the sentencing of a staff sergeant for abuse at Abu Ghraib and on the
sergeant's insisting that the chain of command forced prisoners to submit to degrading
treatment for military intelligence purposes). The defense of "following orders" has largely
been rejected in the Abu Ghraib prosecutions. That said, there is evidence that some
interrogators believed they were following orders. Editorial, War Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec.
23, 2004, at A22 (discussing in particular Guantanamo).
91. See Arianna Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Betiveen
Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al.
92. Administration lawyers had advised that the President was not bound by an
international treaty prohibiting torture or by federal antitorture legislation because of his
authority as Commander in Chief to approve any technique needed to protect U.S. security
and, furthermore, that any executive branch officials (including those in the military) could
be immune from domestic and international prohibitions against torture. Working Group
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal,
Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 21 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://online.wsj.comlpublic/resources/documents/ military_6O4.pdf. The Working Group
Report also provided tightly constructed definitions of torture, concluding that an
interrogator who knows that severe pain will result from his actions lacks the requisite
specific intent to torture even if he acted in bad faith so long as causing this pain was not his
objective. Id at 8-12. The Working Group Report drew heavily from an August 1, 2002
memorandum signed by former Assistant Attorney-General Jay Bybee (currently a judge on
the Ninth Circuit) that argued that the President's wartime powers superseded anti-torture
laws and treaties. Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture "May be Justified", WASH.
POST. June 13. 2004. This memorandum, in turn, derives from several earlier memoranda,
including one authored by John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, from the Office of Legal Counsel (Department of Justice) to
the Department of Defense. Memorandum, Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5025040/site/newsweek.
The August 1, 2002 memorandum generated considerable criticism insofar as it appeared to
justify the use of torture (stopping just short of death) in the war on terror and to immunize
personnel committing torture from legal process. Id. As a consequence of this controversy,
and nearly two years after the memorandum was initially authored, the Department of
Justice disavowed it. David Johnston, Uncertainty About Interrogation Rules Seen as Slowing
the Hunt for Infornation on Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at Al. On December 30,
2004, a new memorandum was issued that superseded the one that had been disavowed.
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Ghraib, in which some of the abuses amount to the kinds of
infringements of the Geneva Conventions that would be criminalized
as war crimes, is a microcosm of a number of much broader questions.
Does individual liability for the perpetrator suffice? Does this
individual liability make life easier for the rest of us, since we can
blame the abuse on a select small group of twisted individuals on the
nightshift? Does their defense - that they were following orders -
make us uncomfortable? What about an even bigger picture: namely,
that the behavior at Abu Ghraib may be nothing more than a mutated
form of our own suspicion of law in allaying our fears of terror?
Guantanamo - isolated, shorn of process, access, and transparency -
sits as another stark metaphor of the perceptions among certain
influential actors of the crimped role law should play in the war on
terror' 3 and, in turn, a site of contestation for other important actors,
including the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts.94
There is an incredible distance between abuse in hors-la-loi prisons
in Baghdad and the automaticity of mass violence. The point, though,
is that for both ends of the continuum, as with many examples of
troubling human behavior, structural factors can be controlled and
incentivized to discourage individuals from acting in a manner that
Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin, acting
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 30, 2004).
This memorandum flatly states that torture violates U.S. and international law and omits the
position that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, could supersede U.S. anti-torture laws,
that U.S. personnel could assert a number of defenses to torture, and the narrow definitions
of torture (namely, that torture had to involve pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function,
or even death"). Id. at 2. However, in December 2004, merely a couple of weeks before
public release of the new memo but well after the disavowal of the August 2002 memo, a
Justice Department lawyer instructed a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that "it would
not be illegal to torture detainees to obtain statements about them." Carol D. Leonnig &
Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New Details and Disputes, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004,
at Al.
93. Goldstone, supra note 8, at 4-5.
94. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction
to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in
connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay). Following the Rasul
decision, Combatant Status Review Tribunals were introduced at Guantanamo to determine
the status of detainees. Detainees are entitled to a personal representative before these
tribunals but the representative is not a lawyer nor is the relationship between detainee and
representative one of privilege. Combatant Status Review Tribunals have been challenged in
federal court, one district court judge has found them to be unconstitutional owing to their
infringement of due process under the Fifth Amendment. In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1236 (D.D.C., Jan. 31, 2005). Moreover, a small number of
Guantanamo detainees face prosecution in military commissions for war crimes. Scott
Higham, Bin Laden Aide Is Charged at First Tribunal, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al.
The military commission proceedings have been mired in controversy and delay. Neil A.
Lewis, Guantdnamo Tribunal Process in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at A31. They,




may seem wholly repugnant after the fact but may well have been
eminently rational at the time. Assuredly, this is a controversial
suggestion. These thoughts are the beginnings of a more difficult
process of discussion and deliberation that transcends the content of
From Nuremnberg to The Hague.
According to social norm theorists, group sanctions can succeed
insofar as group members are in an advantageous position to identify
and monitor the behavior of conflict entrepreneurs. 95 Since the
criminal law currently does not reach acquiescent group members, it
provides them scant incentive to cabin the behavior of conflict
entrepreneurs or control their own reactions thereto. Group members
therefore become unaccountable beneficiaries of the violence instead
of potential gatekeepers. The threat of collective sanctions, on the
other hand, may motivate group members to marginalize the conduct
of conflict entrepreneurs or, even, snuff it out early on. Moreover,
collective sanction does not have to be limited to perpetrator group
members. Would international institutions and foreign states have
responded with the same nonfeasance to genocide in Rwanda were
they to be subject to the reach of collective sanctions?
My point here is that if all ordinary folks somehow would be held
responsible for the carnage perpetrated in situations of mass violence,
some of the major conditions precedent to such violence - namely
the silence of the majority, the complicity of the bystander, and the
inaction of the international community - might well dissipate. If
average citizens believed they might be much worse off if they
followed the eKhortations of conflict entrepreneurs, then fewer would
follow, and some might even discredit these entrepreneurs early
enough in the game to preclude them from gaining momentum.
Individuals tempted by violence might well change course. On the
other hand, since passive acquiescence rarely - if ever - is
implicated in a system based exclusively on individualized criminal
justice, it is unclear how this system can deter this fundamental
prerequisite to mass atrocity.
IV. JUSTICE, AccESSIBILITY, AND EMPOWERMENT
Cherie Booth's contribution to From Nuremberg to The Hague
calls for the active involvement of women in the ICC (p. 163).96 For
Booth, gender diversity among ICC jurists is essential to the ICC's
legitimacy. While I share this sentiment, it is helpful to view issues of
diversity and accessibility in a more subtle manner. Which women,
exactly, should sit on the ICC bench? Does this include women from
95. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345,348 (2003).
96. See also Rome Statute, supra note 16. art. 36(8)(a)(iii) (requiring that there be fair
representation of female and male judges).
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postconflict societies? Or, on the other hand, shall the ICC continue
the practice of ethnic neutrality adopted by the ICTR and ICTY,
where members of victim and aggressor communities are deliberately
excluded from the institution's personnel in the name of impartiality?
Booth's argument may propound gender diversity while
perpetuating the dominance of elite legal technocrats at the expense
of the hard work required to integrate local communities and local
women in the adjudicative process. I certainly do not deny that the
involvement of women jurists at the ICTR and ICTY has influenced
the progressive development of international criminal law, for
example when it comes to proscribing sexual violence. Booth
grippingly documents how the presence of Judge Navanethem Pillay
- "a South African Indian, and the only female judge on the
Rwandan Tribunal at the time" (p. 168) - on the bench during the
prosecution of Jean-Paul Akayesu (a local mayor accused of
involvement in the Rwandan genocide) was instrumental in allowing
testimony of sexual violence to be adduced and in turn utilized by the
Prosecution in successfully pursuing charges of genocide and rape as a
crime against humanity (pp. 167-71). Booth is correct to link the
existence of gender diversity among international jurists and
prosecutors to the expanding criminalization of sexual violence against
women.97 Even if the retributive and deterrent value of this
criminalization might be called into question, the expressive value of
making such conduct firmly and flatly illegal has tremendously
positive implications in the struggle toward gender equality. That
alone, however, is not enough; for the law truly to be purposive, it
must welcome - to borrow from Derek Bell - "the faces at the
bottom of the well"98 so that they can assert ownership over their own
trauma and articulate their own response. International criminal law
will induce a democratic deficit for so long as it does not include, in
the process of accountability, the voices of those actually afflicted
by the violence.99 It also may thereby replicate patterns of
97. Pp. 165-67. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T (ICTY Trial
Chamber, Feb. 22. 2001), affd, Case No. IT-96-23-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber, June 12,
2002); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY Trial Chamber, Dec. 10,
1998).
98. DEREK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACIsM (1993).
99. Concerns over democratic defects and operational pluralism are not limited to
international criminal law. See, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam, Saving the Tortoise, the Turtle, and
the Terrapin: The Hegemony of Global Environmentalism and the Marginalization of Third
World Approaches to Sustainable Development, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER 15
(Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Obijiofor Aginam eds., 2003) (arguing that international
environmental law has failed to take into account those practices and belief systems of the
countries of the South that are relevant to sustainable development).
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political dominance that characterize the international socio-legal
order generally.
In this vein, Sands discusses the role of national courts in the
adjudication of international crimes. He does not explore the potential
of local or indigenous justice mechanisms that, in many places, may
carry greater legitimacy among the general population. Sands believes
that there is an important role for national courts in the process of
accountability (pp. 70-71, 81). I share this sentiment. That said,
international lawyers must recognize that the national justice systems
of conflict states may have little credibility due to their misuse as tools
of repression during periods of authoritarian rule. What is more,
Sands appears less amenable to a pluralistic definition of how those
national or local institutions should proceed. MHs frame of reference
essentially is one where proceeding nationally implies subsidiary
implementation of the modalities of international criminal trials
which, in turn, means the superimposition of the dominant criminal
law methodologies of those states that dominate the world-order.
Instead, those contemplating the future of international criminal
justice may consider looking at alternative mechanisms, such as
those that draw from restorative justice, local custom, or indigenous
legal process.
By "national" courts, international lawyers actually mean two
distinct types of courts: (1) those of the place where the international
crimes occurred (discussed in the previous paragraph); and (2) those
in other places. Sands unpacks the role of national courts in other
places. These courts - invoking principles of universal jurisdiction -
in certain narrow cases may assert jurisdiction over foreign
perpetrators of systematic human rights abuses against foreign
nationals (pp. 89-102). Sands explores this phenomenon through a
case study of the litigation initiated in Spain against General Pinochet
of Chile, which led to a decision by the House of Lords permitting
Pinochet's extradition to Spain from the U.K. (where he had been
detained after entering the U.K. for medical treatment). Sands also
discusses the 2002 opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
concerning a dispute between Belgium and the Congo regarding the
legality of an arrest warrant of a Congolese government minister. In
this case, the ICJ invoked the doctrine of official immunities under
customary international law to limit the reach of foreign national
courts over human rights abusers who were official heads of state or
ministers at the time the abuses are alleged to have taken place."°
100. Under customary international law, official immunities can serve as a defense to
charges of international crimes. This defense, however, has been narrowed and, in certain
cases, eliminated by the statutes of international courts such as the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR,
and internationalized domestic courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Rome
Statute, supra note 16, art. 27; Statute of the ICTY, supra note 18, art. 7(2); Statute of the
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Sands's comments are generally supportive of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction as a mechanism to secure justice."0 ' For a variety of good
reasons, he is critical of the ICJ decision (p. 108). Sands does not
address concerns, however, with universal jurisdiction that transcend
tired political realist arguments. One important concern is that judicial
verdicts delivered by far-away courts may have little meaning among
populations affected by the violence. Furthermore, Belgium's
assertions of universal jurisdiction present a double-edged sword
insofar as Belgium's colonial abuses in the Congo and Rwanda
(Belgian courts have convicted Rwandans for genocide) intimately tie
it to the violence. This, in turn, problematizes the ex post intervention
of Belgian courts in the name of human rights. Involving national
courts in the process of adjudicating extraordinary crimes should
implicate, first and foremost, the legitimate courts of the place affected
by the violence, not foreign national courts embarking on messianic
enforcement of human rights while ignoring their own responsibility
for the decay of those same rights. Of course, there are cases where
the national (or local) courts of the place where the violations took
place are closed to any claims because the authoritarian abusers are
still in office. In such situations, I would argue that proceeding through
an international institution such as the ICC - notwithstanding its
shortcomings - is preferable to proceeding through a distant foreign
national court.
Various contributors to From Nuremberg to The Hague examine
the doctrine of complementarity, which is the principle guiding the
interplay of the ICC with national courts (pp. 63-65, 74-81). According
to this principle, the ICC only will assert jurisdiction over a case when
it decides that national courts are unwilling or unable genuinely to
investigate or prosecute.' 02 The complementarity mechanism of the
ICC is much more nuanced than the brusque primacy given the ICTY
and ICTR over all national proceedings. For Sands, the principle of
complementarity means that "the ICC will play a residual role" (p.
75). As I see it, however, the ICC's role may be residual in form but
not in substance. National institutions in post-conflict societies may
feel inclined to adopt procedures that look much like those at the
ICTR, supra note 17, art. 6(2); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 19,
art. 6(2).
101. Moreover, Sands has intervened as amicus curiae in litigation before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in favor of the argument that an international court may exercise
jurisdiction over a serving head of state and that this head of state may not claim immunity
under customary international law in respect of international crimes. Prosecutor v. Charles
Taylor (SCSL, No. 2003-01-I), Submission of the Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/Sands.pdf.
102. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 17.
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ICC to minimize the risk of ceding jurisdiction to the ICC. After all,
it is a safe bet that, for an ICC judge, a "genuine" prosecution will
be one that approxiInates the method employed by the ICC.
Complementarity. therefore, may encourage heterogeneity in terms
of the number of institutions adjudicating international crimes,
but homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the
punishment they inflict. This does not give much of a chance to
those legal processes that deviate from the dominant methodology
of international criminal law, regardless of the legitimacy,
scrupulousness, or connectivity of those local processes.
CONCLUSION
Most international lawyers are very proud of the new institutions
of international criminal law. Certainly, there is much cause for that
pride. These institutions are the product of hard work in the face of
seemingly intransigent political gridlock. With this pride, however,
understandably comes some defensiveness. This leads to a situation
where the critic of international criminal law institutions often is
viewed with considerable reserve. Part of the problem is that
criticizing international criminal law institutions often puts the critic,
no matter how well-intentioned, in the company of those who believe
such institutions to be scurrilous or actually detrimental to national
security interests.'03 This mode of political realism, which expresses
considerable reserve regarding the legalization of international
relations and the judicialization of politics, has proven influential to
many governments, including that of the United States, when faced
with the prospect of mass violence perpetrated by non-state-actor
terrorists. There has been a resurgence of cynicism about the role of
law in international affairs. In this regard I must agree with Booth,
who distinguishes modesty about the potential of international
criminal justice from cynicism (p. 177).
This cynicism sees law as something that stands in the way of
combating security threats, thereby leading to a constriction of law.
One example is the conscious decision by the U.S. to categorize
terrorist attacks as armed attacks instead of criminal attacks, but then
view international humanitarian law - which customarily governs the
conduct of belligerents in armed conflict - as "quaint" and something
to be circumscribed in conducting the war on terror.'"' This has given
103. GEORGE F. KENNAN, DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD (1951); HENRY
KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (2001).
104. Alberto Gonzales. Memorandum to the President, Decision Re Application of the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban
(January 25, 2002) (document on file with the author). See also Neil A. Lewis & Eric
Schmitt. Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004. at
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rise to Guantanamo, as discussed previously, along with a much
broader array of policies, practices, and contestations. 105
Paradoxically, perhaps, Overy's contribution to From Nuremberg
to The Hague teaches us about the dynamic role played by the United
States, in particular Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President
Truman, in establishing the Nuremberg tribunal at a time when British
leaders would have preferred to "subject enemy leaders to a quick
despatch before a firing squad" (pp. 3-4). Similarly, the United States
has been an advocate of ad hoc tribunals judging international crimes
in places as diverse as Rwanda, Cambodia, and the former
Yugoslavia.'06 It supports a transparent legal process for Saddam
Hussein and his cronies." The idea that due process, law, and public
trials are necessary for the perpetrators of unspeakable violence,
Al (concluding that after the September 11 terrorist attacks the administration's lawyers
"were set to work to find legal arguments to avoid restrictions imposed by international and
American law"); Edward Alden, Dismay at legal justifications for torture, FINANCIAL TIMES
(LoNDON), June 10, 2004, at 7 (reporting that the memoranda regarding torture of terrorist
suspects take "some extreme positions" wholly inconsistent with settled law).
105. For example, the White House has claimed that it has the unilateral ability to
declare a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then deny that individual access to any form
of legal process to contest the indefinite detention that might result. Anthony Lewis. A
President Beyond the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A31. This has been challenged by
the judicial branch. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that due
process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker); see also Adam Liptak, For Post-9/11 Material Witness, It Is a Terror of a
Different Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (reporting on aggressive use of material
witness warrants by U.S. prosecutors to detain those believed to have knowledge of terrorist
activities); supra note 90 (discussing torture memoranda). Another example involves the
accountability of the executive branch. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the
White House that declaring Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees were not covered by the
Geneva Conventions "substantially reduces" the threat of criminal prosecution for war
crimes (defined to include any grave breach of the Geneva Conventions) under domestic
U.S. law. Gonzales, supra note 104; John Barry, Michael Hirsh, & Michael Isikoff, The Roots
of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.comlid/498948; see also
Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, available
at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/ (reporting that "the internal memos
show that administration lawyers were privately concerned that they could be tied for war
crimes themselves based on actions the administration [was] taking"). Secretary of State
Colin Powell submitted a sharp critique of this recommendation. Colin L. Powell,
Memorandum for Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President
on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (January 26,
2002) (document on file with the author). The President followed suit by stating that Taliban
detainees were entitled to the coverage of the Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda
fighters were not; however, he then denied actual prisoner of war status to all detainees.
Katherine Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al; Paul
Koring, No PoWs Being Held in Cuba, Bush Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 8, 2002,
at A12.
106. Landsman, supra note 7, at 1582.
107. Although it is important to remember that prior to the March 2003 conflict, the
United States offered Saddam Hussein amnesty if he abandoned power.
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however, has lost luster among U.S. governing elites when U.S.
citizens are affected by that violence. This diminishing prioritization
has acquired an additional outlet in the form of American
exemptionalism from international conventions in the war on terror,
and, in Crawford's words, "the unhappy and extravagant opposition"
of the United States to the ICC (p. 109).Y
The purpose of my critique of international criminal law is not to
constrict law. Abandoning law frightens me more than naively
venerating legalism. My intent in this Review is, instead, to affirm the
importance of law in the process of international cooperation and to
underscore law's potential for stigmatizing enemies of humanity and
remembering their victims. The only way for international criminal
law effectively to grow in this direction is through a sustained process
of critique and reflection. From Nuremberg to Thle Hague is a valuable
step in this direction. It praises extant methods, but realizes that they
still disappoint. It then draws strength by viewing disappointment as a
prerequisite for improvement. From Nuremberg to The Hague also
carries this debate to a broader nonspecialist audience, thereby
serving a catalytic pedagogical function. I hope to continue this debate
through this Review by suggesting that further restructuring of extant
thinking is required in order for international criminal law truly
to be transformative.
108. On the relationship between the United States and the ICC, see Sands and Booth,
pp 76-77, 187-91. Booth's hope that the United States would remain within the ICC
framework was dashed in April 2002 when President Bush announced the United States
would in fact unsign the Rome Statute. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM '9-11' TO TBE
IRAQ WAR 2003 88 (2004) (adding that the legal effect of the decision to unsign "release[ed]
the US from any obligation not to act inconsistently with the object and purpose of the ICC
Statute").
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